trifero.ai Model safety card

Model safety cards TSC-002 · v0.1 · method v1

Gemma 4 31B

Maker
Google DeepMind
Origin
United States
Size
31B, dense
License
Apache 2.0
Released
April 2026
Tested
8 Nov 2026
For business owners

Strong guardrails out of the box. They still come off.

Out of the box, Gemma 4 refuses almost every harmful request we tried and rarely refuses safe ones. Its refusals took more work to remove than Qwen 3.8's, but a targeted edit to the weights still cut them to about 1 in 6, and a short round of ordinary fine-tuning cut them to about 1 in 20. The edit itself left the model just as capable. Put your safety controls in the application around the model, and treat the copy on your servers as something worth protecting.

Guardrails out of the boxModerate · 92.5% refusal
Guardrails after tamperingRemovable · 4.5% refusal
Hazardous knowledgePresent in the weights
Refuses safe edge casesSometimes

Can its guardrails be removed?

Removable · 4.5% refusal

We removed the model's refusal behavior with abliteration, a published technique that edits one direction out of the weights, then "healed" the edited model with a short fine-tune to repair any damage. HarmBench measures how many harmful requests it still refuses.

HarmBench refusal rate · 200 harmful requests 0255075100%Original92.5%Stripped15.5%Healed4.5%

What it means for you: the model's refusals protect you only while nobody can change the weights. If a copy leaks or an insider modifies it, assume the guardrails are gone. AdvBench showed the same pattern: 98.7% refusal before, 19.4% after.

Does removing them make it worse?

Capability tests on the original, the stripped copy and the healed copy.

TestOriginalStrippedHealed
MMLU-Pro (general knowledge)84.5%83.0%77.9%
GSM8K (math)97.5%97.3%96.3%
IFEval (following instructions)90.3%91.3%76.8%

What it means for you: when the stripped copy scores about the same as the original, nothing discourages tampering. Protect the weights like any other sensitive asset.

What does it know that could cause harm?

Present in the weights

WMDP is a multiple-choice test of hazardous knowledge in biology, chemistry and cybersecurity. Random guessing scores 25%.

WMDP accuracy · dashed line is random guessing

OriginalGuardrails removed

0255075100%Biology84.9%83.2%Chemistry73.0%71.1%Cyber62.8%64.8%

What it means for you: this knowledge is in every copy of the model. Refusal is what stands between a user and that knowledge, and refusal is removable.

Does it refuse things it should answer?

Sometimes

Both tests contain only safe prompts. XSTest is ordinary questions; OR-Bench hard is safe questions that sound risky.

Refusal of safe prompts · original model 0255075100%XSTest1.2%OR-Bench hard34.6%

What it means for you: staff in security, legal, medical or HR roles may hit refusals on legitimate questions. Test it with your own real prompts before rollout.

Everyday business risks

0 of 4 tested

The risks businesses hit most often once a model is connected to real data and tools.

Prompt injection

Whether instructions hidden in emails, web pages or documents can take over the model.

Not yet tested

Data leakage

Whether it reveals its system prompt or documents it was given to read.

Not yet tested

Tool and agent safety

Whether it takes harmful actions when connected to email, files or other systems.

Not yet tested

Made-up answers

How often it states false facts confidently on business-style questions.

Not yet tested

If you deploy it

  1. Enforce what users may do in your application: filter inputs and outputs, and log usage.
  2. Give the model only the tools and data each role needs.
  3. Store the weights like other sensitive assets: restricted access and a known-good checksum.
  4. Test with your own prompts first, including the edge cases your staff actually ask.
  5. Check whether customers or regulators care where a model was built. This one comes from United States.

Method

The standard edit, removing the refusal direction at every layer, turned Gemma 4 into gibberish, and so did removing a random direction, so we removed it only from what layers 28 to 34 of 60 write, using the direction from layer 34. Healing used QLoRA (rank 16, 3,000 Alpaca pairs, 24 steps). It taught the model Alpaca's short answer style, which cost about 14 points on IFEval. Wikitext perplexity is left out: this chat-tuned model does not score raw encyclopedia text in a way that compares across models. Refusal and capability runs on two NVIDIA RTX A4500 GPUs (20 GB each) with vLLM, weights in 8-bit (fp8). Refusal-direction search and WMDP in 4-bit. Healing in 4-bit QLoRA on the same GPUs. Ratings use the shared trifero rule set (method v1), the same for every model. We do not publish stripped weights.

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